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Summary 
In  1993  Argentina  began  implementing  workfare  programs,  and  workfare  has  become  a 
central  public  policy  starting  2002  when  the  government  increased  the  number  of 
beneficiaries  from  100,000  to  2  million  people  in  a  country  of  38  million.  We  explore 
targeting, poverty and employability effects of workfare before 2002 based on the permanent 
household survey (EPH). We find that the program was pro-poor although more than one 
third  of  participants  did  not  satisfy  the  eligibility  criteria.  Our  estimates  suggest  that  the 
income  of  participants  increased  during  treatment  -  particularly  for  women  -  indicating 
beneficial short run poverty effects. However, the long run effects of the program are not 
obvious due to selection on treatment completion. We present evidence suggesting that –for 
a large fraction of participants- the program generated dependency and did not increase 
their human capital. 
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1  Introduction 
Argentina suffered a deep economic, social and political crisis in the last few years. 
The economy shrunk by about 11 percent in 2002, and due to the currency’s depreciation, 
GDP per capita dropped off to approximately US$ 3,000 (down from US$ 8,000 at its peak in 
1998). 
The crisis sharply aggravated the country’s already difficult social situation. During 
2002  poverty  and  unemployment  reached  their  maximum  historical  level:  more  than  50 
percent of Argentine households were below the poverty line, and almost 20 percent of the 
labor force was unemployed. Unemployment was particularly severe among the least-skilled 
workers, the rate being higher than 30 percent. This extremely negative context also had an 
impact on the education and health sectors where there is growing evidence of deterioration 
in  service  delivery.  The  combined  effect  of  all  these factors  was  an  increasingly  volatile 
social situation with high levels of violence and protests (see Fiszbein et al. 2002). 
Table 1 Long term trends in Poverty, Unemployment, Economic Growth and Workfare 
Programs in Buenos Aires (1980-2004) 
Workfare programs  











(millions of pesos) 
1980 8.0 2.0 4.5 - -
1985 16.0 6.1 -2.0 - -
1990 38.1 7.5 -1.8 - -
1991 25.2 6.5 10.5 - -
1992 18.6 7.0 9.9 - -
1993 17.3 9.6 5.7 26,236 94
1994 17.6 11.5 5.8 33,365 118
1995 23.5 17.5 -2.8 48,909 125
1996 27.3 17.2 5.5 62,083 134
1997 26.2 14.9 8.1 126,264 299
1998 25.1 12.8 3.9 112,076 259
1999 26.9 14.2 -3.4 105,895 241
2000 29.3 15.1 -0.8 85,665 162
2001 34.1 17.4 -4.4 91,806 160
2002 52.0 19.7 -10.9 1,126,387 2,030
2003 51.7 15.6 8.8 2,171,265 3,924
2004* 42.7 14.6 9.0 2,017,165 3,631
e
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo and INDEC 
Notes: (*) Estimates for the first semester of 2004. 
e  The  figure  is  the  annual  estimated  expenditure  based  on  an  expenditure  equal  to  $2,723  million  up  to 
September 2004. From 1991 to 2001, 1 peso was equal to 1 US dollar; since 2002, 1 peso was approximately 
equal to 0.33 US dollars. 
In 2002, one of the main policies implemented by the government to deal with the 
crisis was to significantly increase the budget allocated to active labor policies. The number   3 
of  beneficiaries  of  workfare  programs  increased  from  90,000  in  December  2001,  to 
1,200,000 in October 2002, and to 2,000,000 in 2003. The recent decline in unemployment 
and poverty has been presented by the government as evidence of the positive income and 
employability effects of workfare programs (Ministerio de Trabajo, 2003). 
Allocating more funds to social sectors, and particularly to labor programs, seems to 
be an adequate policy considering the current difficult situation. However, several questions 
have  been  raised  in  Argentina  regarding  the  fairness  and  effectiveness  of  workfare 
programs. These programs have been pointed out as a source of political clientelism and 
corruption1, and many analysts argued that their employment effects are questionable. In 
spite of the topic’s importance, most of the arguments are based on anecdotal evidence: 
there are very few empirical evaluations of these programs. Our research objective is to 
contribute  to  the  debate  by  providing  an  econometric  evaluation  of  the  poverty  and 
employability effects of workfare programs in Argentina, using the Encuesta Permanente de 
Hogares (Permanent Household Survey, hereafter EPH).  
While our focus is on the Argentine case, we consider that the study is relevant to 
other countries, particularly those in Latin America, where active labor policies have been 
advocated as a way to soften the shocks generated by market-oriented reforms (Heckman et 
al., 1998; Goldbert L. and C. Giacometti, 1998; Marquez, 1999). 
The  paper  is  organized  in  five  sections.  The  next  section  briefly  describes  the 
characteristics of workfare programs in Argentina. The third section presents our research 
objectives, a review of the empirical evidence and the knowledge gaps. The fourth section 
presents the methodology and the data. The fifth section presents the results, and the last 
section cites our conclusions. 
2.  Brief background of workfare programs in Argentina 
Currently, Jefes de Hogar is the main workfare program. It was implemented a few 
weeks after president Duhalde took office in February 2002. However, workfare programs in 
Argentina  have  been  implemented  since  1993,  and  while  the  program  names  have 
changed
2, they all have all the same basic characteristics and objectives
3. In this paper we 
                                                            
1 Ronconi (2001) surveys the main Argentine newspapers and finds that most of the press reports 
related to workfare programs mention the existence of political clientelism and corruption in the funds 
allocation process. 
2 In 1993 it was called Programa Intensivo de Trabajo, from 1995 to 2001 Programa Trabajar, and 
since 2002 Programa Jefes de Hogar. Provincial governments also implemented their own workfare 
program with similar characteristics to the federal ones. In terms of magnitude the most important 
program was Barrios Bonaerenses implemented by the provincial government of Buenos Aires.   4 
evaluate workfare programs during 2000 and 2001 (i.e. before the implementation of Jefes 
the  Hogar).  The  main  program  during  these  years  was  called  Trabajar.  The  common 
features of these workfare programs were as follows: 
•  These programs targeted the least-skilled unemployed workers, preferably the heads of 
household. People who receive unemployment insurance benefits or a pension, or hold a 
job (even if it is in the informal sector) were not allowed to participate
4.  
•  Participants  received  a  monthly  benefit  below  the  minimum  wage
5,  during  a  certain 
period (between three and six months) paid by the government
6. 
•  During that period participants received training and had to work between twenty and 
forty hours per week
7 on communitarian projects at public or non-profit organizations
8. 
•  The objectives of the program were: To act as a short-term safety net, and to increase 
employability among the least-skilled unemployed workers. 
3  Research objectives and knowledge gaps 
The following three components help define our research objectives: 
3.1  Program targeting 
A review of workfare programs in OECD and some developing countries found that 
public-service  jobs  are well  targeted at  low-income  unemployed  workers  when  the  wage 
rates have been set very low (See Dar and Tzannatos, 1999). 
In  Argentina,  the  benefit  is  below  the  minimum  wage  so  we  might  expect  self-
targeting as argued by Jalan and Ravallion (2003). However, the state has low enforcement 
capacity, hence some benefits might be assigned to individuals who are not unemployed, 
but already hold a job. However, a second and more important concern is that, due to lack of 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
3  See  the  Argentine  executive’s  decree  number  327/1998  for  the  Trabajar,  and  the  executive’s 
decrees number 165/2002 and 565/2002 for the Jefes de Hogar. A detailed description of workfare 
programs in Argentina is provided in Ministerio de Economía (2002) and Ronconi (2001). 
4 Jefes de Hogar includes the following additional restriction: Applicants, in order to be eligible, have 
to show proof that their children are attending school and receiving appropriate medical treatment 
(such as vaccines). 
5 The maximum monthly benefit in the Trabajar was US$200 – and most of the beneficiaries actually 
earned $200- while the monthly benefit in the Jefes de Hogar is fixed at US$150 per month. The 
minimum  wage  in  the  formal  sector  in  Argentina  is  between  US$300  and  US$350  per  month 
depending on the industry. 
6 Both the Trabajar and the Jefes de Hogar were partially financed through a loan from the World 
Bank. 
7 In Jefes de Hogar the work requirement is 20 hours per week, while in Trabajar it was between 30 
and 40 hours per week. 
8 Jefes de Hogar allows participants to work in private companies provided that the employer pays the 
payroll tax and the necessary additional amount of money to meet the minimum wage.   5 
sound political institutions, some benefits might be allocated based on political patronage, 
and not economic need (e.g. benefits assigned to friends, relatives or clienteles of influential 
politicians).  Furthermore,  anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  these  beneficiaries  do  not 
comply with the workfare work requirement. Therefore, in a poor institutional environment 
such as the one that characterizes Argentina, it is not necessarily true that imposing work 
requirements and setting the benefit below the minimum wage implies self-targeting. 
Kremenchutzky  (1997)  and  Ministerio  de  Trabajo  (1999)  have  surveyed  a  small 
number of workfare program participants (60 and 159 respectively), and they find few cases 
(less than 10%) where participants do not meet the eligibility requirements to receive the 
benefit (i.e. the participant is well-educated or already holds a job)
9. Ronconi (2001) presents 
anecdotal  evidence  showing  several  cases  where  the  jobs  are  assigned  on  a  political-
clientele basis, or different forms of corruption in the allocation process
10. 
Thus,  our  first  objective  is  to  describe  the  socio-economic  characteristics  of 
participants and non participants, using the Permanent Household Survey, in order to verify 
if  the  participants  are  in  fact  those  who  need  the  program  most.  We  answer  several 
questions, such as: Do participants have any other source of income? How many of them 
are  heads  of  poor  households?  Do  participants  have  low  educational  levels?  Which 
proportion of the unemployed and poorly educated workers does not receive the benefit
11? 
3.2  Poverty effects 
A second concern is related to the poverty effect of workfare programs. Even in the 
case  where  the  program  is  well  targeted,  it  is  necessary  to  measure  the  income  gain 
conditional on income in the absence of the program, to assess its impact. Common practice 
has been to estimate the gains by the gross wages paid, assuming that the labor supply to 
the program came only from the unemployed and from people who were out of the labor 
force.  But,  even  if  a  participating  worker  was  unemployed  at  the  time  she  joined  the 
program, it does not mean that she would have remained unemployed had the program not 
existed. 
                                                            
9 Ronconi (2001) argues that these figures should be interpreted with caution because the cases were 
not randomly selected from the population of workfare participants. 
10 Just to mention a few examples: In greater Buenos Aires, participants reported receiving 2/3 of the 
benefit, while the remaining third was held by the political boss who gave them access to the benefit. 
In  La  Matanza,  funds  were  distributed  by  local  leaders  instead  of  been  assigned  directly  by  the 
government to the participant, as the legal procedure stipulates. Some participants were forced to 
participate in political demonstrations in order to receive the benefits. 
11 Regrettably, the EPH does not include any political variable. Hence, we are not able to check if in 
fact  corruption  and  political  clientelism  characterize  funds  allocation.  However,  we  consider  that 
providing  a  reliable  estimation  of  the  percentage  of  participants  who  do  not  meet  the  eligibility 
requirements constitutes an improvement given the poor quality of the existing empirical evidence, 
and also an input for further studies.   6 
Ministerio de Trabajo (2003) argues that the Programa Jefes de Hogar helped 29.3 
percent of households that were below the indigence line to move out of indigence, and 6.5 
percent  of  households  that  were  below  poverty  to  become  non-poor. This  ‘estimation’  is 
done assuming that benefits are targeted towards the poorest, and that the income gain of 
participating in the program is equal to the benefit. For the aforementioned reasons this 
analysis is not very informative. 
Jalan and Ravallion (2003) estimate the net income gains of workfare programs in 
Argentina during 1997 constructing the counterfactual from a group of non-participants. They 
have exploited the cross section characteristic of the Encuesta de Desarrollo Social (EDS), 
and find average gains of approximately $100 per participant per month (i.e. 50% of the 
benefit). While this is the first serious attempt to measure the effects of the program, the 
results may suffer a bias as suggested in Ronconi (2001)
12. 
In this paper we compute the average net income gain of workfare programs
13, using 
a  different  database  (i.e.  the  Permanent  Household  Survey)  and  a  matching  pairs 
approach
14. The data and our empirical approach allow us to estimate the short and medium 
run poverty effect of workfare programs
15,16. 
3.3  Employability effects 
Finally, we assess the employability effects of workfare. According to Bartik (2001), 
public service programs significantly increased the long-run earnings of participants in the 
US, since they provide some work experience and the needed soft skills. Do we observe this 
                                                            
12  Jalan  and  Ravallion’s  (2003)  results  are  based  on  a  sample  of  2,802  participants.  Is  this  a 
representative  sample  of workfare  participants?  The  authors  randomly  selected  350  projects,  and 
mention that some participants were dropped from the random sample because their addresses could 
not  be  found,  or  because  they  did  not  want  to  respond.  Assuming  that  the  average  number  of 
participants per project is 20 –which is a conservative estimate- implies that 350 projects includes 
7,000 participants. Ronconi (2001) questions how representative are the analyzed 2,802 participants. 
13 The EPH allows distinguishing participants from non participants, but it does not inform in which 
specific workfare program the participants are participating. During the period we analyzed (i.e. 2000-
2001) the main program was Trabajar, although other federal and provincial workfare programs were 
in  place  such  as  Programa  de  Emergencia  Laboral  and  Barrios  Bonaerenses  in  the  province  of 
Buenos Aires. 
14  Since  we  do  not  follow  a  general  equilibrium  approach,  we  ignore  indirect  effects  such  as  an 
increase  in  income  due  to  the  increase  in  aggregate  demand  generated  by  the  program.  These 
indirect effects were probably small before December 2001 because the number of participants was 1 
percent of the labor force. However, they presumably have become important after 2002 when the 
government increased the number of participants to almost 15 percent of the labor force. 
15 We estimate if the direct income gains generated by the program helped the participants to move 
out of poverty and/or indigence. We use the official poverty and indigence lines which are described in 
the next section.    7 
effect  in  the  Argentine  case?  How  did  participants  perform  in  the  labor  market  after 
treatment? Are participants more or less likely to be employed than individuals in the control 
group after program completion? Does participation affect the odds of getting a formal job
17? 
Do ex-participants receive higher wages due to treatment? Or is the workfare program a 
disguised income transfer? Furthermore, did workfare have any negative impact, such as 
‘signaling’ or stigma effects on participants? Did the program generate dependency among 
participants? 
None of these questions have been appropriately answered in Argentina. As far as 
we are aware, there are no statistically reliable evaluations of the employment effects of 
workfare programs. Our objective is to contribute towards filling this gap, exploiting the panel 
characteristic  of  the  EPH  and  implementing  a  matching  pairs  approach  to  construct  the 
control group
18. 
We  also  analyze  the  predisposition  of  employers  to  hire  workfare  program 
participants, based on a poll conducted during 2002 by the Ministerio de Trabajo (Encuesta 
de Indicadores Laborales). 
To summarize, our research objective is to analyze how well targeted is the program, 
and how effective it is in reducing poverty and increasing employability. 
4 - Methodology and data sources 
The empirical strategy adopted in this study is the result of the research objectives 
advanced in the previous discussion and the characteristics of the available data. 
The main analysis is based on the Permanent Household Survey (EPH). The data is 
collected and processed by the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC). The 
survey has been conducted bi-annually (in May and October) since 1974, and covers 28 
urban  agglomerates  representing  62  percent  of  total  population  of  the  country  and  98 
percent of the population living in centers with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Each survey 
contains approximately 80,000 individuals and 25,000 households. The sampling and data 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
16 The long-run poverty effect of the program is much harder to assess. It would be necessary to 
measure how the program affects several outcomes. For example, Franceschelli and Ronconi (2002) 
argue  that  there  exists  a  causal  relation  between  the  introduction  of  workfare  programs  and  the 
emergence  of  the  Piquetero  movement  in  Argentina.  To  the  extent  that  the  Piquetero  movement 
constitutes an empowerment of poor and previously unorganized people, it presumably affects how 
income is distributed. 
17 We define formal jobs as those jobs where the worker gets contributions to the social security 
system (i.e. health insurance, pension, and unemployment insurance). 
18 Galasso and Ravallion (2003) also estimate poverty effects of workfare programs using the EPH, 
but while they focus on the Jefes de Hogar program, we study poverty and employability effects of the 
programs that were in place before Jefes, mainly the Trabajar.   8 
collection  techniques  used  by  the  INDEC  ensures  the  validity  and  reliability  of  the 
information (See Appendix 1 for more details). 
The  EPH  contains  information  related  to  occupational,  educational  and 
socioeconomic characteristics, both at the individual and household level. Since October 
2000, it has included a specific question that allows the econometrician to determine if the 
individual participates in a workfare program. 
The  EPH  has  a  rolling  panel  structure:  Each  household  is  surveyed  for  four 
successive periods, and each period 25 percent of the surveyed households are replaced by 
new ones. This characteristic of the survey is quite useful for this study since, by providing 
information before and after treatment, it allows estimating the employability effect of the 
program  and  controlling  for  unobserved  time  invariant  characteristics.  Regrettably,  each 
individual is followed only for four waves (i.e. two years), thereby impeding an estimation of 
the long run effects of the program.  
There are two additional advantages of using the EPH as the source of information to 
estimate the effects of the program: First, the same questionnaire was administered to both 
participants and non-participants. Second, the EPH contains information regarding the urban 
agglomerate where the individual works, allowing us to construct the comparison sample 
with  individuals  who  reside  in  a  similar  local  labor  market  as  program  participants.  As 
Heckman et al. (1998) point out, these two characteristics of the data prevent important bias 
from  arising.  Furthermore,  they  show  that  bias  due  to  the  use  of  different  surveys  and 
differences in the distribution of participants and comparison groups across the local labor 
market is often large relative to selection bias. 
4.1  Targeting 
To  assess  how  well  targeted  workfare  is,  we  analyze  several  socioeconomic 
characteristics  of  participants  and  non-participants,  both  at  the  individual  and  household 
level, such as: education, work experience, type of residence, access to basic services and 
household  income  per  capita.  We  follow  INDEC’s  definition  of  poverty  and  indigence  to 
measure the proportion of beneficiaries below poverty, and the proportion of poor people not 
receiving the benefit
19. 
                                                            
19 The poverty line is calculated based on the 1986/87 income and expenditure survey, and updated 
using price indices for food and non-food components. For example, in October 2000 the poverty line 
is US$151.1 per male adult, per month. To calculate poverty, household composition is converted into 
male adult equivalents using standard conversion factors. The indigence line is based exclusively on 
the food consumption portion of the poverty line, and for 2000, is equal to US$62.4 per male adult, 
per month. See more details in Appendix 2.   9 
4.2  Poverty Effects 
A simple way to analyze the income effect of workfare programs during treatment is 
to  compare  the  income  of  participants  during  treatment  relative  to  their  income  before 
treatment.  However,  this  estimate  is  presumably  biased  for  several  reasons  as  we 
suggested earlier. First, those individuals who participate in the program presumably have 
different characteristics than those who do not participate, and if those characteristics also 
affect  labor  performance  the  estimate  would  be  biased.  Second,  the  macroeconomic 
situation in Argentina deteriorated significantly during the period 1998-2002, hence it would 
be misleading to attach all changes in participants’ income to the program. 
In order to compute the program’s short-run poverty effects, we need to measure the 
income gain conditional on income in the absence of the program (Heckman et al., 1998). 
The “with” data is provided by the EPH (i.e. we observe the income of participants). But the 
“without” data (i.e. what would have been the income of participants in the absence of the 
program) is fundamentally unobserved, since an individual cannot be both a participant and 
a  non-participant  at  the  same  time.  Following  the  conventional  evaluation  literature,  we 
assume the existence of a group of individuals comparable to participants except for not 
having received benefits. We use propensity score matching methods to draw a comparison 
group to workfare participants from the large number of non-participants available in the 
EPH
20. More specifically: 
Let Di=1 if individual i participates in the program, and Di=0 if she/he does not participate. 
Let Xi be a vector of variables that helps predict participation in the program; and P(X) = 
Prob(D=1/X) is the probability of participating conditional on X, the propensity score. 
We calculate the propensity score for each individual in the Permanent Household 
Survey using standard probit model. In order to ensure that participants and their matched 
non-participants are affected by the same local labor market conditions we run six separate 
regressions, one for each region
21. 
Then,  for  each  region,  we  select  from  the  group  of  non-participants  the  five 
individuals who have the most similar propensity score to each participant. These selected 
non-participants constitute the comparison group. 
                                                            
20 The reason we use a non-experimental method to estimate the effects of the workfare program is 
because  experimental  data  is  not  available.  Also,  we  use  a  control  group  drawn  from  “external” 
sources (i.e. non-participants) because there is no available information to distinguish between those 
non-participants who applied but were not selected from those who did not apply. Bell et al. (1995) 
provides a clear exposition about the pros and cons of using a control group drawn from ‘external’ 
versus ‘internal’ sources.   10 
One way to measure the mean income effect of the program during the period when 
participants are receiving the benefit is by estimating µ: 
(1)  Yi = Wiβ + µDi + Ui 
Where Yi is the monthly income of individual i, Wi is a set of variables that affect 
income, Di is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual i is participating in the workfare 
program and equal to 0 if she/he is from the comparison group. (Notice that only participants 
and  their  respective  ’nearest  neighbor  non-participants’  are  included  in  the sample;  non-
participants who are not part of the comparison group are excluded). 
This estimator is based on a cross-section of individuals so it does not confront the 
problem  of  attaching  changes  in  the  macroeconomic  situation  to  the  program.  Also,  by 
construction, the estimator controls for observed characteristics of individuals. However, a 
potential problem with this estimator is that program participants and their respective non-
participating nearest neighbors may differ according to unobservable characteristics, and if 
those  unobserved  characteristics  also  affect  labor  performance  the  estimates  would  be 
biased.  
However, by considering the income of both participants and the control group in a 
period before treatment and computing a difference-in-difference estimator, it is possible to 
remove the bias generated by time invariant unobserved factors. The difference-in-difference 
estimator of the income effect of the program during treatment is given by coefficient δ: 
(2)  ∆Yi = ∆Wiθ + ∆Diδ + εi 
Where ∆Yi = Yit - Yit-1 is the change in income of individual i between periods t and t-
1, and treatment takes place during period t. The sample is also restricted to participants and 
the comparison group. 
Finally,  we  compute  the  percentage  of  participant  households  who  moved  out  of 
poverty using the average income gain estimated via equation 2. While this strategy does 
not allow us to claim any long-term effects over poverty reduction, at the least it assesses 
the importance of workfare programs as short run safety nets. 
4.3  Employability Effects 
Our third objective is to estimate the employability effects of workfare. We evaluate if 
participants are more or less likely to find a job in the formal sector, earn a higher wage and 
a higher hourly wage after program completion. As in the previous case, the fundamentally 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
21 We consider that this strategy leads to a reliable comparison group since the EPH contains a wide 
range of socio-economic characteristics for each individual, allowing us to control for a large number   11 
unobserved  data  is  the  employment  performance  and  salaries  of  participants  ‘without’ 
treatment.  Again,  our empirical  strategy  is  to  use  propensity  score  matching  methods to 
draw a comparison group to workfare participants from the large number of non-participants 
available in the EPH. 
But unlike the previous case where we were interested in the income effect during 
treatment, now we need after-treatment outcomes. Taking advantage of the panel structure 
of the Permanent Household Survey we compute ‘before and after’ treatment difference-in-
difference  estimators.  For  each  of  the  dependent  variables  of  interest,  we  run  a  model 
similar to equation (2) except that in this case we focus on changes in Yi between t+1 and t-1 
(Recall that t refers to the period when participants receive treatment). 
Considering that the rolling panel structure of the EPH allows to follow the same 
individual for four waves (i.e. two years), we can estimate the employability effects of the 
program six and twelve months after program completion.  
At this stage an important point should be re-emphasized: During the period under 
consideration, the overall state of the Argentine economy suffered major changes. GDP per 
capita decreased 25 percent, the unemployment rate went up 3 percentage points, and the 
share of informal employment increased from 37 percent to 50 percent. Under such a crisis, 
it  would  be  incorrect  to  attach  all  the  negative  changes  in  participants’  outcomes  to  the 
workfare  program. In  other  words,  a  ’before  and  after‘  estimator  based  exclusively  on  a 
sample of participants should be discarded, or at least taken with extreme caution. However, 
since we also work with a comparison group of non-participants, and under the assumption 
that the crisis had a similar effect over the outcomes of participants and their respective non-
participants  nearest  neighbors,  we  can  isolate  the  workfare  program’s  effects  from  the 
economic crisis by computing a difference-in-difference estimator. 
Summing up, we follow the conventional evaluation literature. The value added of our 
paper is that we use these standard methods to explore a database and answer several 
questions that have not been analyzed yet
22. 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
of observable factors. Obviously, unobserved heterogeneity is a potential problem, and we discuss it 
below.  
22 Let us mention that there are several potential extensions to the methodology we follow in this 
paper.  For  example,  instead  of  taking  May  2001  as  the  unique  treatment  period,  a  more  flexible 
methodology  would  be  to  construct  a  larger  dataset  including  those  individuals  who  received 
treatment during different periods of time; in which case, time dummies should be included to account 
for changes in the macroeconomic performance. A second plausible extension would be to construct 
the comparison group not only based on the characteristics of participants and non-participants during 
treatment, but also on their characteristics before treatment allowing controlling for Ashenfelter’s dip. 
While this alternative clearly improves the quality of the matching, we decided not to implement it 
because it significantly reduces the number of observations in our sample. (Recall the rolling panel 
structure of the EPH). In any case, these may be constructive extensions to this paper, and we leave 
them for further work.    12 
5  Results 
5.1  Targeting 
In this section we analyze how well targeted towards the low skilled and unemployed 
workers were workfare programs in October 2000 and May 2001, before the large expansion 
occurred in early 2002 (i.e. before the Jefes de Hogar program was implemented). 
During the periods we note that the number of beneficiaries was a very small share of 
those who needed support. While beneficiaries were approximately 100,000, the number of 
unemployed people was 1.5 million, and the number of people living in households below 
the poverty line was 9 million. Therefore, we expect to find that a large share of poor and 
unemployed  people  did  not  receive  the  benefit.  But  were  the  scarce  benefits  allocated 
properly?  Tables  2,  3  and  4  present  basic  socioeconomic  characteristics  for  program 
participants and all non-participants. 
Table  2  Socioeconomic  Characteristics  of  Participants  and  Non-participants  of 
Workfare Programs, May 2001 
Characteristics  Participants  Non-participants 
Age  35.0 years  37.1 years 
Gender (% female)  58.3%  52.3% 
Head of Household   38.0%  38.9% 
Number of members in the household  5.0  4.5 
Residence located in a shantytown  4.0%  2.0% 
Lack of access to water, electricity or 
sanitary installations  6.4%  5.2% 
Residence ownership (yes=1)  72.2%  72.1% 
No. observations  655  45,242 
Note: The sample is restricted to all individuals between 18 and 65 years old. 
Almost  60  percent  of  participants  are  female,  less  than  40  percent  are  head  of 
household and 4 percent live in a shantytown. The average participant is 2.1 years younger 
and  has  a  higher  probability  of  living  in  a  shantytown  and  not  having  access  to  water, 
electricity or sanitary installations than the average non-participant. The differences are not 
large. 
Regarding educational attainment, we observe that participants are on average less 
educated  than  non-participants.  But,  again,  the  difference  is  not  very  large.  While  42.6 
percent of the beneficiaries have 7 or less years of schooling and 17.4 percent have at least 
some college education (i.e. more than 12 years of schooling), the figures for the group of 
non-participants are 34.1 percent and 26.0 percent respectively.   13 
Table  3  Educational  Attainment  of  Participants  and  Non-Participants  of  Workfare 
Programs, May 2001 
Maximum education attained  Participants  Non-participants 
Primary school dropout  13.6%  9.6% 
Primary school graduate  29.0%  24.5% 
High school dropout  23.4%  20.7% 
High school graduate  16.3%  19.2% 
Some college  11.8%  15.7% 
College graduate  5.6%  10.3% 
Total  100%  100% 
Note: Primary school graduate implies 7 years of schooling, and High school graduate implies 12 
years of schooling. 
We also observe that 18.2 percent of workfare participants not enrolled in school 
report at least one of the following sources of income in addition to the workfare benefit: a 
formal job, an informal job, self-employment income, pension or unemployment insurance. 
This  is  preliminary  evidence  that  a  large  share  of  the  benefits  have  not  been 
assigned  to  the  poorest  unemployed  and  least  skilled  workers  as  established  in  the 
normative. The inadequate allocation of benefits becomes more evident when we analyze 
household income per capita: Only 22.1 percent of participants were below the indigence 
line,  35.4  percent  were  below  the  poverty  line  but  above  the  indigence  line,  and  the 
remaining  42.6  percent  were  above  the  poverty  line
23.  Table  4  shows  that  the  average 
participant  was  poorer  that  the  average  non-participant,  but  the  differences  are  not  that 
large. On the other hand, only 4.8 percent of the total number of indigent households in 
Argentina had a member participating in the program. 
Table 4 Indigence and Poverty rates for Participants and Non-Participants, October 
2000 
  Participants  Non-participants 
Non-Poor  42.6%  67.8% 
Poor  57.4%  32.2% 
- Poor but not Indigent  35.4%  22.9% 
- Indigent  22.1%  9.3% 
Total  100%  100% 
Note: The figures are for individuals. However, since indigence and poverty are defined according to 
household income per capita, we categorized a household as ’participant‘ if at least one member is 
participating in the workfare program. In October 2000, the number of participating households was 
lower than the number of participating individuals because 13 percent of participating individuals were 
members of a household that had two or more members participating in the workfare program. 
                                                            
23  These  figures  are  computed  including  the  benefit  as  a  component  of  income.  The  alternative 
extreme assumption is to compute poverty based on the income of participants without including the 
benefit. As we mentioned before any of these alternatives is adequate: In order to properly analyze 
how well targeted was the workfare program according to family income, it is necessary to compute 
the income of participants in the absence of the program. This analysis is done in the next section. 
See table 12.   14 
We also observe that, while most of participants are members of households located 
in the poorest quintiles, one fourth of beneficiaries are members of a household that ranks in 
the top 50 percent of the income per capita distribution in both October 2000 and May 2001. 
Table  5  Distribution  of  Participants  according  to  household  income  per  capita, 
October 2000 and May 2001 
Deciles familiar income p/c  October 2000  May 2001 
1
st decile (Poorest 10%)  30.6 %  25.5% 
2
nd  13.8 %  18.2% 
3
rd  11.1 %  15.3% 
4
th  11.8 %  10.4% 
5
th  8.2 %  9.9% 
6
th  6.7 %  6.5% 
7
th  5.8 %  5.2% 
8
th  6.0 %  4.2% 
9
th  3.6 %  2.6% 
10
th (Richest 10%)  2.5 %  2.3% 
In  order  to  get  a  measure  of  inclusion/exclusion  errors  in  workfare  targeting  we 
categorize an individual as eligible if: She/he has dependent children, has no job, does not 
receive a pension or unemployment insurance, and is located in the bottom half of the family 
income per capita distribution
24. 
Table 6 compares eligibility between workfare participants and non-participants aged 
18-65 years old. We observe that 43 percent of participants did not satisfy the eligibility 
criteria, while only 4 percent of eligible people received the benefit. 
Table  6  Distribution  of  Participants  and  non-participants  according  to  eligibility 
criteria, May 2001 
  Eligible  Ineligible  Total 
Participants  341  264  605 
% row  56.4%  43.6%  100% 
% column  3.7%  0.8%  1.4% 
Non-participants  8,897  33,281  42,178 
% row  21.1%  78.9%  100% 
% column  96.3%  99.2%  98.6% 
Total  9,238  33,545  42,783 
Note: The sample is restricted to individuals 18 to 65 years old with complete information in all the 
variables used to define eligibility. 
                                                            
24 Having dependent children refers to children less than 18 years old residing in the household. The 
’no job‘ requirement for participants actually means that we categorize them as ineligible if they report 
income as self-employees, or report having a formal job, or report having more than one job. We 
thank Habiba Djebbari for suggesting a table of inclusion/exclusion errors.    15 
Summing  up,  the  evidence  suggests  that  the  limited  number  of  benefits  was  not 
appropriately distributed
25. This evidence is consistent with the argument that setting work 
requirements and the benefit below the minimum wage are not sufficient conditions to ensure 
self-targeting in countries with a lack of sound political institutions such as Argentina
26. 
5.2 Poverty effects 
The first and critical step in estimating program poverty effects is to find a comparison 
group of non-participants who has sufficiently similar characteristics to participants except for 
not participating in the program. 
We  run  standard  probit  models  –one  for  each  local  labor  market
27-  to  estimate 
propensity scores. The vector Xi of individual and household characteristics includes the 
following  variables:  age,  age  squared,  gender,  marital  status,  migration  status
28,  work 
experience, maximum level of education attained, if attending school, if the person is head of 
household, number of dependents in the household, household members per room, quality 
of  the  residence  (e.g.  if  the  residence  has  access  to  water,  electricity  and  sanitary 
installations), location of the residence (i.e. if the residence is located in a shantytown), and 
ownership of residence. 
We  take  May  2001  as  the  base  state.  The  reason  we  choose  this  survey,  and 
discarded using more recent surveys as the base state, is because it allows us to analyze 
the  performance  of  ex-participants  several  months  after  treatment.  Furthermore,  since 
workfare became almost universal by October 2002, it might not be possible to find a reliable 
matching pair to each participant from the group of non-participants for that –or more recent- 
period. We also discarded October 2000 as the base state because it does not allow us to 
observe the situation of participants before treatment. Recall that October 2000 is the first 
survey that included a specific question about participation. 
                                                            
25  As  a  caveat  it  should  be  mentioned  that,  while  the  INDEC  assures  the  confidentiality  of  the 
collected information, it is always possible that some individuals do not report accurate information. 
For example, an individual who participates in the program and does not meet the eligibility criteria 
might have the incentive to report that he does not participate, in which case the true targeting of the 
program would be worse that the figures presented above suggest. We suspect this is not a large 
problem because the eligibility requirements are seldom enforced by the government. 
26 As Besley and Kanbur (1990) argue, perfect targeting (i.e. benefits allocated to the poorest) is not 
optimal in practice since it implies high administrative costs (i.e. the government has to spend too 
much  money  collecting  information  and  monitoring  if  it  tries  to  reach  the  poorest).  However,  we 
consider that the extent of misallocation of workfare funds cannot be justified by administrative costs.  
27  We  use  the  region  as  an  indicator  of  local  labor  market.  There  are  six  regions  in  the  EPH: 
Northwest,  Northeast,  Cuyo,  Pampeana,  Patagonica  and  Greater  Buenos  Aires.  A  more 
disaggregated definition of the local labor market is to use the urban agglomerate. There are 28 urban 
agglomerates in the EPH. We choose the region because there are several urban agglomerates with 
very few workfare participants impeding an adequate identification of a comparison group. However, 
we include indicators of urban agglomerates as controls in the estimation of propensity scores. 
28 Individuals are categorized into three groups: Foreign born, born in a different province, and born in 
the same province where they reside.   16 
In May 2001 the EPH reports 655 individuals who were participating in the six month 
workfare program. The group of non-participants includes almost 50,000 observations. From 
this  large group  we  extracted  the five  nearest neighbors for  each  participant,  creating  a 
comparison  group  totaling  3,275  individuals.  The  following  table  presents  the  probit 
regressions, one for each region. 
Table 8 – Probits for calibrating the propensity score, by region, May 2001 
Greater 
Buenos 














Age  0.05 (1.39)  0.09 (2.91)  0.09 (2.82)  0.05 (1.88)  0.02 (0.96)  0.05 (2.05) 
Age^2  -0.00 (-1.15) -0.00 (-3.61) -0.00 (-2.85) -0.00 (-2.09) -0.00 (-0.96) -0.00 (-1.84) 
Male  -0.04 (-0.29)  0.08 (0.85)  0.02 (0.15)  -0.11 (-1.03) -0.18 (-2.65) -0.25 (-2.55) 
Primary school graduate  -0.18 (-1.00)  0.12 (0.67)  -0.19 (-1.11)  0.05 (0.29)  0.04 (0.39)  -0.27 (-2.00) 
High school dropout  -0.16 (-0.75)  0.13 (0.74)  -0.11 (-0.63)  0.15 (0.81)  -0.08 (-0.70) -0.22 (-1.58) 
High school graduate  -0.29 (-1.23) -0.03 (-0.16)  0.05 (0.30)  0.09 (0.45)  -0.16 (-1.35) -0.50 (-3.18) 
Some college  -0.29 (-0.96)  0.04 (0.20)  0.01 (0.06)  0.15 (0.63)  -0.21 (-1.39) -0.25 (1.34) 
College graduate  -0.15 (-0.54) -0.15 (-0.61)  0.07 (0.30)  0.10 (0.46)  -0.23 (-1.67) -0.91 (-3.29) 
Enrolled in Educ. Inst.  -0.21 (-0.80) -0.19 (-1.07)  0.01 (0.04)  -0.35 (-1.75) -0.12 (-0.96) -0.16 (-1.01) 
Born in other province  -0.24 (-1.56) -0.26 (-2.03) -0.47 (-2.47) -0.09 (-0.79) -0.07 (-0.87) -0.15 (-1.48) 
Born in other country  -0.37 (-1.36)  -  0.08 (0.28)  -0.10 (-0.35)  0.03 (0.14)  -0.12 (-0.97) 
Partner  -0.45 (-2.38)  0.00 (0.03)  0.09 (0.61)  -0.01 (-0.09) -0.07 (-0.74) -0.19 (-1.53) 
Married  -0.56 (-3.28) -0.04 (-0.31) -0.21 (-1.42) -0.30 (-2.26) -0.29 (-3.42) -0.49 (-3.97) 
Divorced  -0.22 (-0.88) -0.27 (-0.93) -0.22 (-0.75) -0.06 (-0.26) -0.11 (-0.85) -0.03 (-0.14) 
Widow  -0.54 (-1.29)  0.07 (0.19)  -0.21 (-0.49) -0.03 (-0.10) -0.39 (-1.92) -0.79 (-1.94) 
Head of household  0.23 (1.54)  -0.11 (-0.92)  0.02 (0.15)  0.02 (0.13)  0.17 (2.20)  0.10 (0.90) 
No. dependents  0.05 (1.40)  0.04 (1.65)  0.02 (0.85)  0.01 (0.16)  0.06 (3.29)  0.03 (1.17) 
Experience  -0.01 (-0.56) -0.02 (-1.92) -0.01 (-1.51) -0.04 (-3.14) -0.00 (-0.75) -0.03 (-2.86) 
Lack access to basic services  0.25 (0.98)  -0.39 (1.99) -0.03 (-0.19)  0.29 (1.48)  0.23 (1.96)  -0.12 (-0.45) 
Resides in shantytown  0.03 (0.08)  -  -0.04 (-0.15)  -  0.26 (1.63)  0.53 (2.82) 
Property ownership  -0.07 (-0.50)  0.01 (0.11)  0.01 (0.05)  0.09 (0.86)  0.03 (0.39)  0.07 (0.68) 
Rooms per member  -0.39 (1.99) -0.06 (-0.53) -0.10 (-0.80) -0.04 (0.37)  0.01 (0.11)  -0.26 (-2.42) 
No. participants  48  95  71  106  211  124 
No. observations  7,065  9,892  5,711  4,840  14,146  5,837 
Log-Likelihood  -262.2  -474.7  -352.8  -427.4  -1027.2  -532.7 
Dependent variable is 1 if participated in workfare in May 2001 and 0 otherwise. Omitted categories 
are  primary  school  dropout,  single,  and  born  in  the  same  province.  All  equations  include  urban 
agglomerates dummies. 
The  average  propensity  score  across  regions  for  those  who  were  participating  in 
workfare is 0.038 while for non-participants it is 0.012, which indicates that these two groups 
have different observable characteristics. The propensity score for the comparison group 
(i.e. the group formed by non-participants that we selected as nearest neighbors) is also 
0.038 making us confident to carry on our strategy
29. It should be mentioned that this is not 
always  the  case.  In  those  cases  where  the  program  is  well  targeted  at  a  particular 
socioeconomic  group  and  most  of  eligible  individuals  receive  treatment  it  may  not  be 
possible for the researcher to draw a reliable comparison group from the sample of non-
                                                            
29  Appendix  3  presents  basic  statistics  for  participants  and  the  comparison  group.  Both  groups 
present very similar observable characteristics as expected.   17 
participants
30. However, during the period being analyzed, the number of beneficiaries was a 
small proportion of the objective population of the program, and the scarce benefits were 
allocated to different socioeconomic groups as shown in the previous section. This situation 
allowed  us  to  construct  a  comparison  group  with  similar  observable  characteristics  to 
program participants. 
The first question we consider is by how much the monthly income of participants 
changed during participation in the program due to treatment. In other words, which would 
have been the income of participants during May 2001, if they were not beneficiaries? The 
first estimates we compute are based on equation (1)
31. Table 9 presents the results. 
Table  9  Estimates  of  Workfare  Program  Effect  during  treatment,  May  2001, 
Participants and comparison group 
Dependent variable  All  Males  Females 
Income in the main occupation  25.56  -50.06  76.90 
  (2.11)  (-2.07)  (6.88) 
Total Income  -8.28  -79.83  39.40 
  (-0.60)  (-2.89)  (3.06) 
Hourly Income in the main occupation  0.87  0.39  1.21 
  (6.74)  (2.80)  (6.14) 
No. observations  3,930  1,645  2,285 
Number of Workfare participants  655  273  382 
Note: t-values reported in parentheses. 
We find that, on average, participants had an income in their main occupation that is 
US$26  higher  than  the  comparison  group  but  a  total  income  that  is  US$8  lower  –but 
statistically not different from zero. We also find that participants have an hourly income in 
their  main  occupation  that  is  US$0.87  higher.  These  estimates  differ  significantly  across 
gender.  On  the  one  hand,  female  participants  had  an  income  in  their  main  occupation 
US$77  higher,  a  total  income  US$39  higher  and  an  hourly  income  US$1.2  higher  than 
females in the comparison group. On the other hand, male participants had an income in 
their  main  occupation  US$50  lower,  a  total  income  US$80  lower  and  an  hourly  income 
US$0.4 higher than males in the comparison group. 
There are several possible interpretations for these results. One possibility is that 
participants and the comparison group differ in unobservable characteristics and the results 
reflect not only program effects but also selection bias. However, assume for a moment 
these are unbiased estimates and discuss selection bias later.  
                                                            
30 We suspect this would be the case if we had chosen October 2002 –or a more recent survey- as 
the base period since by that time workfare programs were almost universal. 
31 The vector Wi of control variables includes the same variables used to estimate the propensity 
score plus regional dummies.   18 
It  appears  that females  benefit  more from  program  participation  than males. This 
result is not surprising given the fact that program benefits are the same for both genders 
and women presumably have fewer opportunities than men in the labor market. The higher 
incentive that females have relative to males to participate may also explain the fact that 
more women than men actually participate in the program. 
Another finding is that treatment appears to increase the hourly earnings and income in 
the main occupation, but has a negative/zero
32 effect on total earnings. This last result is driven 
by male participants, who present a lower total income than the comparison group. Why would 
men thus choose to participate if they could earn a higher total income in the labor market? An 
answer could be gathered after comparing working conditions between participants and non 
participants. Men in the comparison group work an average of 45 hours per week, 56 percent of 
those  who  are  employed  have  informal  jobs,  18  percent  are  unemployed,  and  14  percent 
inactive. Male participants, on the other hand, are all employed and work on average 31.3 hours 
per week (see Table 10). Therefore, a potential explanation is that male participants choose to 
participate because they may prefer to earn a lower total income but work less hours instead of 
working more hours in the informal sector. An alternative explanation is that they choose to 
participate because otherwise they would have remained unemployed. Table 10 also suggests 
that a large share of female participants were presumably ‘inactive’ (i.e. not working or looking 
for a job in the labor market) before joining the program. 
Table 10 Labor Performance of Participants and Comparison Group, during Treatment 
by Gender, May 2001 
Participants  Comparison Group  Variable 
Female  Male  Female  Male 
No. Hours worked per week  24.2  31.3  35.5  44.6 
Unemployment rate  0%  0%  10.9%  17.5% 
Labor force participation rate  100%  100%  49.8%  86.0% 
No. observations  382  273  1,903  1,372 
The estimates in table 9 may suffer a bias as mentioned in the methodology section. 
Controlling for observed heterogeneity between participants and non-participants does not 
eliminate latent heterogeneity that could bias the program’s impact estimates. For example, 
it may be that participants have higher social capital than the comparison group. And it may 
be that it is this higher level of social capital that explains both the higher probability of 
participating in the program as well as the higher level of hourly earnings. Since we do not 
observe  social  capital,  we  cannot  control  for  it.  Therefore,  the  estimates  would 
inappropriately consider the effect of social capital as part of the program effect. A similar 
argument applies for unobserved factors such as ability, effort or motivation.  
                                                            
32 While the coefficient is negative (-8.3), it is not statistically different from zero.   19 
However,  if  the  source  of  heterogeneity  is  time-invariant  we  can  eliminate  it  by 
computing difference-in-difference estimators. For example, the level of social capital, ability, 
effort and motivation might be quite constant through short periods of time. Hence, we can 
solve the problem by analyzing the performance of participants and the comparison group at 
different points in time. 
We  begin  analyzing  the  change  in  income  for  both  groups  –participants  and  the 
comparison group- between October 2000 and May 2001. Recall that May 2001 is the period 
when participants were receiving treatment and October 2000 is the most immediate survey 
before treatment. 
In the EPH for October 2000 we find that 356 people were surveyed out of the 655 
who were workfare program participants in May 2001
33. Running the model described in 
equation (2) we find that (see column 1 in Table 11): Program participation is related with an 
increase on total monthly income equal to US$44.9, increase on monthly income in the main 
occupation by US$53.2 and on hourly earnings US$0.67
34. 
Table 11 Difference in difference estimates of Workfare Program, May 2001 (i.e. during 
treatment) and October 2000 (i.e. before treatment), Participants and control 
group  
Dependent variable  All  Males  Females 
53.3  31.4  67.6 
Income in the main occupation 
(3.98)  (1.26)  (4.77) 
44.9  12.8  67.9 
Total Income 
(2.99)  (0.46)  (4.28) 
0.67  0.29  0.94  Hourly Income in the main 
occupation  (3.07)  (1.73)  (2.75) 
Note: t-values reported in parentheses. The sample includes 356 workfare participants (208 females 
and 148 males) and 1,898 non-participants. 
As with the previous findings, the program appears to be relatively more successful in 
increasing the income of women than men during treatment. For females, the coefficients 
                                                            
33 The socioeconomic characteristics of the 655 workfare participants surveyed in May 2001 are not 
clearly  different  than  the  characteristics  of  the  356  participants  that  were  also  surveyed  during 
October  2000.  For  example,  the  average  (standard  error)  number  of  household members  is  4.99 
(2.46) and the percentage living in a shantytown is 3.97 percent (0.20) in the first group while the 
figures are 5.17 percent (2.51) and 4.21percent (0.20) in the second group suggesting the later is 
poorer. But on the other hand, the percentage without access to basic services is 6.41percent (0.25) 
and property ownership 0.72 (0.45) in the first group compared to 5.62percent (0.23) and 0.79 (0.41) 
in the second group suggesting the former is poorer. We thank Habiba Djebbari for suggesting a 
discussion of the potential attrition bias. 
34 Habiba Djebbari suggested estimating workfare program effects excluding the province of Buenos 
Aires,  since  a  large  provincial  workfare  program  was  implemented  in  that  province  (i.e.  Barrios 
Bonaerenses) in addition to Trabajar. When excluding Buenos Aires, the estimates (and t-values) are 
slightly  higher:  increase  in  total  monthly  income  US$53.4  (3.19),  increase  in  income  in  main 
occupation  US$61.4  (4.11),  and  increase  in  hourly  earnings  US$0.74  (3.22).  The  number  of 
observations used to compute these estimates is 1,870. 
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are: US$67.9 increase in total monthly income, US$67.6 increase in income in their main 
occupation  and  US$0.94  increase  in  hourly  earnings.  All  estimates  are  statistically 
significant.  For  males,  we  find  US$12.8  increase  in  total  income,  US$31.4  increase  in 
income in their main occupation and US$0.29 increase in hourly earnings; but the first two 
estimates are statistically not different from zero. 
The positive estimate of the mean income effect of the program captures the fact that 
the average total monthly income of the comparison group decreased from US$269.2 in 
October 2000 to US$260.3 in May 2001 due to the economic recession that the country was 
suffering, but increased from US$202.1 to US$238.1 for the group of participants. 
Considering that in May 2001 the workfare program benefit was US$200 per month, 
the estimated net income gain of participating in the program represents approximately 25 
percent of the benefit. Our estimate is half with respect to the one computed by Jalan and 
Ravallion (2003). They estimated a net income gain of US$100 per month –or 50 percent of 
the benefit
35. 
The  program’s  positive  income  effect  during  treatment  could  be  explained  by 
considering  that  many  participants  would  presumably  have  remained  unemployed  or 
inactive, and hence without income, in the absence of the program. However, the estimated 
income  effect  is  smaller  than  the  benefit  probably  because  many  participants  would 
presumably have gotten a job and worked more hours in the absence of the program. 
We also observe that 154 individuals appear to be participating in the program during 
both May 2001 and October 2000, representing 43 percent of participants in May 2001. We 
discuss  this  issue  later,  but  so  far  we  want  to  emphasize  that  such  a  high  rate  of 
dependency is unexpected, since the normative establishes that the length of participation in 
the program is between three and six months. 
An additional exercise is to compute poverty effects excluding all those individuals 
who  actually  participated  in  the  program,  but  according  to  their  socioeconomic 
characteristics were not eligible to participate. As we discussed in the targeting section more 
than one third of participants did not meet the eligibility criteria. While this exercise leads to 
biased  estimates  of  the  program  effects,  it  is  useful  from  a  policy  perspective  since  it 
provides an estimate of what the program effects would have been if benefits were allocated 
properly.  The  difference-in-difference  estimator,  including  only  eligible  individuals,  is  a 
positive effect on total monthly income equal to US$80.2 (and t-value equal 6.84). On the 
other  hand,  the  difference-in-difference  estimator  including  only  ineligible  individuals  is   21 
US$11.1 (0.44), suggesting that the inadequate allocation of benefits partially explains why 
the average income effect is quite low
36. 
Summing  up,  we  estimate  that  during  treatment  participants  received  a  monthly 
income US$44.9 higher than what they would have earned in the absence of the program, 
representing almost 25 percent of the benefit. This result does appear to be partially driven 
by the inadequate allocation of some of the benefits. When we restrict the sample to eligible 
individuals,  the  estimated  income  effect  is  US$80.2. We  also  find  that  women  benefited 
more from the program than men. Finally, we observe that 43 percent of those individuals 
who  were  participants  during  May  2001  were  also  participating  in  the  program  during 
October 2000. We will return to this issue later. Now we turn to compute the percentage of 
households who moved out of poverty and/or indigence due to the program. 
Following INDEC’s definition of poverty (see Appendix 2) and using the estimated 
mean income effect of the program (US$44.9 per month), we find, for October 2000, that: 
While the actual percentage of participants below the indigence line was 22.1 percent, in the 
absence of the program the figure would have been 28.1 percent. Similarly, while the actual 
percentage of participants below poverty was 57.4 percent, in the absence of the program it 
would have been 60.9 percent. 
Table 12 Estimates of Indigence and Poverty rates for Participants in the absence of 
treatment  (based  on  an  estimated  income  effect  equal  to  US$44.9  per 
month), October 2000 
  Participants 
Non-Poor  39.1% 
Poor  60.9% 
- Poor but not Indigent  32.8% 
- Indigent  28.1% 
Total  100% 
Note: The figures are for individuals. 
Considering that during October 2000 the number of beneficiaries was  100,000 we 
estimate that as a consequence of the program 6,000 households moved out of indigence, and 
3,500 moved out of poverty. We expand these figures by average household size, leading to an 
estimated reduction in the number of people below the indigence line of 38,000 and a reduction 
in people below poverty of 19,700, implying approximately a 1.2 percentage point reduction in 
Argentina’s indigence rate and a 0.2 percentage point reduction in the poverty rate. 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
35 Their estimation is for the year 1997 and they used a different database. These two factors might 
explain the discrepancy in the results. However, we suspect that the difference could also be due to a 
potential bias on the sample used in Jalan and Ravallion (2003) as discussed in footnote 12. 
36 According to the news reports surveyed by Ronconi (2001), another plausible reason that explains 
why the program effect on income is smaller than the benefit is that a fraction of the benefit (between 
5 and 50 pesos) was actually not received by the participant, but kept by local political bosses in 
exchange for giving people access to the program.   22 
5.3  Employability effects 
In this section we analyze the labor performance of participants after treatment. We 
estimate program effects using equation (2) as described in the methodological section. In 
other  words,  we  study  the  labor  market  performance  of  participants  after  program 
completion, both with respect to their labor performance before entering into the program, 
and with respect to the comparison group. 
We begin studying labor outcomes five months after treatment (i.e. October 2001). 
Out of the 655 individuals who were program participants during May 2001, we only observe 
212 during both October 2000 and October 2001. We also observe the performance of 1,146 
individuals in the comparison group during the same period. Column 1, table 13, presents 
the  difference-in-difference  estimates  of  the  program  effects  between  October  2000  and 
October  2001.  We  observe  an  increase  in  total  monthly  income  equal  to  US$26.5,  an 
increase  in  monthly  income  in  the  main  occupation  US$23.3  and  an  increase  in  hourly 
earnings US$0.13
37. 
Table 13 Difference in difference estimates of Workfare Program. October 2001 (i.e. 
after treatment) and October 2000 (i.e. before treatment), Participants and 
Control Group 
Dependent variable  Column (1)  Column (2) 
23.3  24.1  Income in the main occupation 
(1.68)  (0.88) 
26.5  29.4  Total Income  (1.65)  (0.89) 
0.13  0.09  Hourly Income in the main occupation  (0.98)  (0.49) 
-  0.037  Be employed    (0.66) 
-  0.043  Formal Job (social security coverage)    (0.093) 
-  0.090  Participate in Labor Force    (2.08) 
-  0.053 
Be unemployed 
  (1.26) 
Note:  t-values  reported  in  parentheses.  The  sample  used  in  column  (1)  includes  212  workfare 
participants, and the sample used in column (2) includes 74 workfare participants. 
However, 67 individuals out of the 212 appear to be participating in the program 
during the three periods under consideration. Additionally, 45 appear to be participating both 
during May 2001 and October 2001, and 26 appear to be participating both during May 2001 
and October 2000.  
We drop all those 138 observations, and keep the individuals who were participating 
during May 2001, but were not participating neither during October 2000 nor during October   23 
2001 in order to properly measure before and after treatment outcomes
38. The estimates for 
this restricted sample are in column 2. We find that treatment is correlated with an increase 
in total monthly income by US$29.4, monthly income in the main occupation by US$24.1 and 
hourly earnings by US$0.09. Treatment is also correlated with a higher probability of being 
employed  3.7  percent,  higher  probability  of  having  a  formal  job  4.3  percent,  higher 
probability  of  participating  in  the  labor  force  9  percent  and  higher  probability  of  being 
unemployed 5.3 percent
39. 
Before  proceeding  to  discuss  these  results  we  should  notice  that,  except  for  the 
estimate of the program’s impact on the probability of participating in the labor force, all the 
other estimates are not statistically significant. Three different interpretations for the lack of 
statistical significance of the estimates are plausible. First, by taking into account that the 
labor market is not frictionless, it could be argued that ex-participants actually improved their 
skills during their participation in the program but were not able to take advantage of those 
new skills few months after program completion. According to this hypothesis it is necessary 
to  analyze  the  performance  of  participants  several  months  after  program  completion  to 
uncover the employability effects of the program. A second interpretation is that the program 
actually  had  an  impact  on  the  performance  of  ex-participants  even  a  few  months  after 
participation, but the results we find are statistically insignificant due to the low number of 
observations. A third interpretation is that participants did not improve their human capital 
during participation and the results are simply reflecting that. 
Besides  this  discussion  some  results  are  worth  considering.  A  few  months  after 
program  completion  ex-participants  appear  to  have  a  statistically  significant  higher 
propensity  to  participate  in  the  labor  market.  The  labor  force  participation  rate  of  the 
comparison group  did  not  change much  (it  was  63.9  percent  in  October  2000  and  63.1 
percent in October 2001), but the labor force participation rate of participants increased by 
8.1 percentage points during that period. This result is mainly driven by females. 
We now study program effects by analyzing the performance of participants twelve 
months  after  treatment.  The  May  2002  survey  includes  116  individuals  out  of  the  655 
individuals  who  were  program  participants  during  May  2001  and  were  also  surveyed  in 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
37 When we compute the estimates by gender we find that females benefited more than males as 
before. The estimates (and t-values) for females are: US$35.2 (2.05) effect in total income, US$30.8 
(2.16) effect in income in main occupation, and US$0.21 (1.08) in hourly earnings. For males the 
figures are: US$13.6 (0.45), US$15.1 (0.56), and US$0.02 (0.10) respectively. 
38  Dropping  participants  biases  the  estimates  as  we  discuss  below.  However,  we  consider  worth 
presenting the estimates obtained using this restricted sample since they literally compare the income 
of participants before and after treatment with respect to the comparison group. 
39 The seemingly contradicting result that treatment increases both the probability of being employed 
and  unemployed  is  simply  explained  by  the  finding  that  treatment  increases  the  probability  of 
participating in the labor force by a larger amount than finding a job.   24 
October  2000,  and  580  individuals  in  the  comparison  group. The  difference-in-difference 
estimates of the program effects between October 2000 and May 2002 are (column 1, Table 
14): An increase in total monthly income equal to US$59.7, an increase in income in the 
main occupation equal to US$48.5, and an increase in hourly earnings US$0.31. 
Table 14 Difference in difference estimates of Workfare Program. May 2002 (i.e. after 
treatment)  and  October  2000  (i.e.  before  treatment),  Participants  and 
Control Group 
Dependent variable  Column (1)  Column (2) 
48.5  53.3 
Income in the main occupation 
(2.43)  (1.54) 
59.7  84.2 
Total Income 
(3.07)  (2.38) 
0.31  0.15 
Hourly Income in the main occupation 
(1.53)  (0.41) 
Note:  t-values  reported  in  parentheses.  The  sample  used  in  column  (1)  includes  116  workfare 
participants, and the sample used in column (2) includes 34 workfare participants. 
However,  these  are  not  literally  ’before  and  after  treatment‘  estimates  because  a 
large fraction of those who participated during May 2001 appear also to be participating in 
October 2000 and/or in May 2002. More specifically, 34 percent of those individuals who 
were participating during May 2001 were also participating during both October 2000 and 
May  2002.  This  means  that  one  third of participants received the benefit for at least 19 
consecutive months. Also, 20 percent were participating during both October 2000 and May 
2001 but not during May 2002, and 16 percent were participating during both May 2001 and 
May 2002 but not during October 2000. Adding up these figures, they imply that 70 percent 
of those individuals who entered the program stayed for more than six months. 
This  result  is  unexpected  since  the  normative  establishes  that  the  length  of  the 
program  is  between  three  and  six  months.  While  renewal  of  benefits  was  not  explicitly 
prohibited,  there  was  an  implicit  solidarity  objective  in  the  program.  The  idea  was  to 
distribute  the  scarce  benefits  among  as  many  poor  people  as  possible.  Hence,  those 
applicants who did not participate before have priority over those who did participate and - 
as we already showed - during the period under consideration there was a large number of 
low skilled and unemployed people who never received the benefit. While this result does 
not prove the existence of political clientelism in the allocation of benefits, it is consistent with 
that  presumption.  Furthermore,  it  is  consistent  with  the  claim  that  a  poorly  implemented 
social policy would lead to dependency. 
Since  the  estimates  in  column  1  are  not  literally  ’before  and  after  treatment‘ 
estimates, we proceed to compute truly ’before and after treatment‘ estimates by keeping 
only all those individuals who participated during May 2001 but did not participate during   25 
both October 2000 and May 2002 (column 2, table 14): Treatment is related to an increase 
in  total  monthly  income  equal  to  US$84.2,  and  an  increase  –although  statistically  not 
different from zero- in hourly income. 
While  these  are  truly  ‘before  and  after  estimates’  they  are  presumably  not  true 
treatment  effects.  The  reason  is  that  dropping  from  the  sample  those  participants  who 
stayed longer than the established program length biases the estimates if those who left the 
program are different from those who stayed. To the extent that workfare has operated more 
as permanent unemployment insurance than as a fixed term program, then restricting the 
sample to those who left the program overestimates treatment effect: Once individuals are 
able to enter into the program they remain participating until being offered a sufficiently good 
job  in  the  labor  market.  The  fact  that  the  estimated  total  monthly  income  effect  of  the 
program excluding those who stayed participating is 40 percent larger with respect to the 
estimate obtained including them (i.e. column 2 versus column 1 in Table 14), supports this 
interpretation.  We  leave  the  need  to  control  for  selection  out  of  the  program  for  future 
research. 
Another obvious limitation of the available data is that we can only follow the same 
individual for a relatively short period of time: only two years. Presumably, a more accurate 
assessment of the program would be obtained if data for several periods before and after 
treatment were available. 
5.4  Are Employers willing to hire workfare participants?  
Before concluding, it is interesting to analyze the opinion of employers regarding their 
predisposition  to  hire  participants  of  workfare  programs.  The  Ministerio  de  Trabajo 
conducted  a  survey  among  1,290  firms  asking  employers  if  they  would  hire  a  workfare 
participant in case she/he meets the qualifications needed for the job
40: 78 percent of the 
employers answered yes, and 22 percent no. Among those who answered yes, 86 percent 
said that they would hire a program participant conditional on the skills of the worker, 47 
percent  conditional  on  the  experience  of  the  worker,  and  24  percent  because  hiring  a 
workfare participant implies that the firm receives a subsidy from the state
41. Among those 
who  answered  negatively,  52  percent  considers  that  workfare  participants  do  not  have 
enough  skills  and  experience,  and  45  percent  mentioned  that  they  would  not  hire  a 
participant because they are problematic and not trustworthy. 
                                                            
40 The survey was conducted among medium and large firms that operate in the formal sector, during 
2002  (when  the  Jefes  de  Hogar  program  was  already  implemented),  in  Greater  Buenos  Aires, 
Rosario, Cordoba and Mendoza (the four largest urban agglomerates in Argentina). See the Encuesta 
de Indicadores Laborales at the Ministerio de Trabajo webpage: www.trabajo.gov.ar   26 
Table 15 Predisposition of employers in the private sector to hire workfare program 
participants: “In case a participant of the program Jefes de Hogar meets 
the  qualifications  needed  for  a  job,  would  you  hire  her/him?”  (multiple 
answer). 
Yes if…  78%  No because…  22% 
She/he meets the qualifications  84%  Most of them do not have either 
the skills or the experience 
52% 
She/he has experience   47%  They do not have references  49% 
She/he has the needed education  31%  They are problematic, not 
trustworthy 
45% 
Reduces costs due to the $150 
state subsidy 
24%  Their skills are obsolete  27% 
Others  2%  Others  16% 
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo, Encuesta de Indicadores Laborales 
The survey does not provide the ideal information to asses the employability effect of 
workfare programs. Employers are asked about their predisposition to hire participants -in 
which case they would receive a subsidy. However, we would like to know if employers have 
any preference for ex-participants relative to comparable workers who never participated in 
the  program.  Second,  the  questionnaire  only  allows  employers  to  express  their  motives 
choosing between the options: “Yes, if” and “No, because”. More adequate options would 
have been: “Yes, because” and “No, because”. In any case, and taking into consideration 
these  caveats,  we  interpret  the  opinions  of  the  employers  as  evidence  that  workfare 
programs  may  not  improve  the  skills  of  participants.  The  fact  that  22  percent  of  the 
employers  mentioned  that  they  would  not  hire  program  participants  despite  the  US$150 
subsidy  supports  that  interpretation.  Moreover,  the  results  suggest  that  participating  in 
workfare  programs  may  have,  to  some  extent,  a  negative  effect  on  the  employability  of 
workers because some employers believe that workfare participants are prone to conflict. 
However, this stigmatization effect does not appear to be large since only 10 percent of all 
employers reported that concern. 
Concluding Remarks 
A mixed picture arises after analyzing targeting, poverty and employability effects of 
workfare programs in Argentina during 2000 and 2001. 
On  the  one  hand,  an  active  labor  policy  targeted  at  the  least  skilled  seems 
particularly  appropriate  considering  the  increase  in  poverty  and  unemployment  that 
Argentine society suffered during this period. We observe that the policy was actually pro-
poor, and the average participant had less human capital than the average non-participant. 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
41 A firm that hires a Jefes de Hogar participant receives a subsidy equal to US$150 from the state, 
and  has  to  pay  the  payroll  tax  and  at  least  the  minimum  wage.  These  two  costs  account  for 
approximately US$350.   27 
Targeting  towards  the  poor  also  improved  over  time.  More  women  than  men  received 
treatment,  which  is  presumably  a  positive  characteristic  of  the  program  considering  that 
women  have  fewer  opportunities  in  the  labor  market.  The  program  was  effective  in 
increasing  participants’  income  and  reducing  poverty  particularly  during  treatment:  We 
estimated  that  during  treatment  income  increased  by  approximately  US$50,  helping  3.5 
percent of participating households move out of poverty and 6 percent out of indigence, 
implying that 38,000 people moved out of indigence and 20,000 out of poverty thanks to 
workfare programs. Moreover, we estimate that in the absence of the program one third of 
participants would have had remained inactive or unemployed. After program completion, we 
observe  that  ex-participants  perform  worse  than  during  treatment  but  better  than  before 
treatment, which is remarkable considering the deterioration of the economy. The program 
also increased the propensity to participate in the labor force. These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that at least some ex-participants improved their human and/or social 
capital during treatment. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  observe  that  a  large  share  of  the  scarce  benefits  was 
allocated to non eligible individuals. During May 2000, approximately one third of participants 
were individuals with at least some college education or members of households ranked in 
the top 50 percent of the income distribution. At the same time only 4 percent of eligible 
individuals were participating. While we estimate that during treatment income increased by 
US$50, this figure only represents 25 percent of the benefit. During treatment, the biggest 
positive program effect was on hourly earnings, mainly due to a reduction in working hours, 
suggesting that some participants may have chosen to participate in the program instead of 
working longer hours, probably in the informal sector. We also observe that more than half of 
those who entered the program stayed for more than six months, which was the program’s 
length established in the normative. Furthermore, 34 percent of participants received the 
benefit  for  at  least  19  consecutive  months.  These  facts,  together  with  the  inadequate 
allocation  of  some  benefits,  are consistent  with  the  hypotheses that  some  benefits  were 
allocated on the basis of political patronage and that the program generated dependency 
among recipients.  
Finally,  the  fact  that  some  participants  were  able  to  stay  for  more  than  the  time 
established in the normative obscures the positive after treatment effect mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. It seems plausible that the estimated income gain not only reflects an 
improvement in the human and social capital of participants, but also reflects that those 
participants who were offered a good job in the labor market are the ones that chose to 
leave the program. This is consistent with the claim that workfare in Argentina operated 
more  as  unemployment  insurance  than  as  a  training  program.  Finally,  according  to  the   28 
opinions  of  employers,  they  do  not  express  much  interest  in  hiring  program  participants 
despite the subsidy they would receive. Moreover, 10 percent of employers expressed their 
reluctance to hire workfare participants because they consider them prone to conflict. 
Regarding  the  statistical  model,  there  are  several  plausible  alternatives  and 
extensions  to  the  model  we  used  that  were  already  mentioned.  Presumably,  the  most 
important  extension  is  to  model  the  fact  that  some  participants  select  when  to  exit  the 
program. 
Finally,  from  a  policy  perspective,  we  want  to  emphasize  that  nowadays 
approximately 2 million individuals –equivalent to almost 15 percent of the labor force- are 
participating  in  the  Jefes  de  Hogar  workfare  program.  The  magnitude  of  the  figure  is 
impressive. While our estimates refer to the workfare programs that preceded Jefes (e.g. 
Trabajar),  and  extrapolating  is  always  risky,  these  programs  are  very  similar  in  several 
dimension  making  us  confident that the  estimates  obtained  in  this  paper  are  informative 
enough to discuss the adequacy of the Jefes de Hogar program. 
In  our  opinion,  a  drastic  reduction  on  the  number  of  beneficiaries  is  not 
recommended considering the impact it would have on the well being of participants and 
their dependents, which in most cases are below poverty. However, it is hard to imagine a 
healthy future for the Argentine society if such a large percentage of its members continue 
depending  on  workfare  subsidies.  First,  the  productivity  of  participants  during  treatment 
seems  to  be  very  low  –actually,  many  of  them  are  not  working  at  all-  affecting  growth 
prospects. Second, we are worried about the effects of workfare on political liberty. So far, 
the program has been mainly controlled by the executive branch of government and not by 
an  independent  body.  Incumbent  politicians  seem  to  be  more  interested  in  maintaining 
power instead of improving societal welfare, leading to a clientele usage of workfare funds. 
How can workfare participants vote freely if their main source of income is a workfare benefit 
received  from  the  executive  power  and  used  in  exchange  for  supporting  an  incumbent 
politician?   29 
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Appendix 1.  Encuesta Permanente Hogares –Permanent Household Survey- (EPH) 
The EPH is a sampling survey implemented by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y 
Censos (INDEC) in 28 urban agglomerates. The rigorous application of statistical methods 
ensures the validity and reliability of collected information (selection of sample members is 
conducted using random selection techniques, data collection methods are uniform, etc). A 
detailed  description  of  sampling  and  data  collection  techniques  is  available  at 
www.indec.gov.ar. The sample has a wide representation of the Argentine population as the 
following table shows: 
  
Provinces  Total  
population  
Census 91  
(A) 
ratio (%)  
of province  
to total  
population 




Census 91 (B) 





ration (%) of  
urban  
population  
to total  
population  
(B/A) 
Ciudad de Bs As  2965403  9,1  Ciudad de Bs As  2965403  100,0  10,4 
Catamarca  264234  0,8  Gran Catamarca  121815  46,1  0,4 
Cordoba  2766683  8,5  Rio Cuarto(*)  138853  5,0  0,5 
Gran Córdoba  1175400  42,5  4,1 
Corrientes  795594  2,4  Corrientes  258103  32,4  0,9 
Chaco  839677  2,6  Gran Resistencia  292287  34,8  1,0 
Chubut  375189  1,1  C. Rivadavia-Rada Tilly  127038  33,9  0,4 
Rawson-Trelew (***)  97355  25,9  0,3 
Entre Ríos  1020257  3,1  Concordia(*)  116485  11,4  0,4 
Gran Paraná  207041  20,3  0,7 
Formosa  398413  1,2  Formosa  147636  37,1  0,5 
Jujuy  512329  1,6  Jujuy-Palpala  219924  42,9  0,8 
La Pampa  259996  0,8  Santa Rosa-Toay  80592  31,0  0,3 
La Rioja  220729  0,7  La Rioja  103727  47,0  0,4 
Mendoza  1412481  4,3  Gran mendoza  773113  54,7  2,7 
Misiones  788915  2,4  Posadas  210755  26,7  0,7 
Neuquén  388833  1,2  Neuquén-Plottier  183579  47,2  0,6 
Resto de Bs As  4625650  14,2  Bahia Blanca-Cerri  265885  5,7  0,9 
Mar del Plata-Batán(*)  519065  11,2  1,8 
Gran La Plata  642979  13,9  2,3 
San Nicolás de los Arroyos  (***)  119302  2,6  0,4 
Carmen de Patagones (***)  17075  0,4  0,1 
Río Negro (**)  506772  1,6  Viedma (***)  40398  8,0  0,1 
Salta  866153  2,7  Salta  368659  42,6  1,3 
San Juan  528715  1,6  Gran San Juan  352691  66,7  1,2 
San Luis  286458  0,9  San Luis-El Chorrillo  113074  39,5  0,4 
Santa  Cruz  159839  0,5  Rio Gallegos  64640  40,4  0,2 
Santa Fe  2798422  8,6  Gran Santa Fé  396991  14,2  1,4 
Gran Rosario  1117322  39,9  3,9 
Villa Constitución (***)  41161  1,5  0,1 
Santiago del  
Estero 
671988  2,1  Sgo del Estero-La Banda  261824  39,0  0,9 
Tierra del Fuego  69369  0,2  Ushuaia-Río Grande  67303  97,0  0,2 
Tucumán  1142105  3,5  Gran Tucumán-Tafí Viejo  652882  57,2  2,3 
Total País  32633528  100,0  20208800  61,9  71,1 
Total Urbano   28439499  87,1 
Source: EPH-INDEC 
27,9 
(*)Agglomerates introduced in October 1995 
            
Buenos Aires  7969324  24,4  Partidos del Conurbano  7948443  99,7 
   31 
Appendix 2.  Indigence and Poverty line methodology 
This study follows the Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos (INDEC) definition 
of poverty and indigence. The method used by the INDEC to measure poverty and indigence 
is presented below. 
Indigence 
The concept of “indigence level” (or indigence line), IL, aims to assess whether the 
households  earn  enough  income  to  purchase  a  food  basket  that  satisfies  a  minimum 
threshold  of  energetic  and  protein  needs.  Thus,  a  household  that  does  not  meet  that 
threshold is considered indigent. The procedure is based on the use of a Canasta básica de 
alimentos -basic food basket- (CBA), determined as a function of the consumption patterns 
of  a  reference  population  defined  according  to  the  results  of  the  1985-86  Household 
Expenditure  and  Income  Survey.  The  procedure  also  takes  into  account  the  prescribed 
kilocalories and protein requirements for that population (as specified in the “Basic Food 
Basket for the Equivalent Adult”, included below). Once the CBA components have been 
established,  their  prices  are  assigned  according  to the  Indice  de  Precios  al  Consumidor 
(CPI) for each measurement period. 
Since  human  nutritional  requirements  vary  according  to  age  and  gender,  INDEC 
adjusts for each person’s characteristics, taking as reference the requirements of a male 
aged between 30 and 59 years old. This reference unit is called the “equivalent adult” and is 
assigned  the  value  1.  The  table  of  equivalences  of  energetic  requirements  for  each 
consumer unit in terms of equivalent adult is presented in the table below. 
Each household’s composition in equivalent adults determines a specific CBA value 
for that household. (For example, in October 2000, the CBA value for an equivalent adult 
was $62,4). As a final step, the specific value of each household’s CBA is compared to the 
household’s  total  income.  If  the  total  income  is  less  than  the  household’s  CBA,  the 
household and its members are considered to be under the indigence level.  
Poverty 
The measurement of poverty by the poverty level or “poverty line” (PL) method is 
based  on  determining,  from  the  household’s  reported  income,  whether  the  household  in 
question is able to satisfy -through the purchase of goods and services- a set of nutritional 
and non-nutritional goods considered essential. In order to calculate the poverty line the 
INDEC determines the CBA value and compounds it with the inclusion of non-nutritional 
goods and services (clothing, transportation, education, health care, etc.) so as to obtain the 
value of the Canasta basica total -total basic basket (CBT).   32 
 
For the purpose of compounding the CBA value, the so-called Engel coefficient (EC) 
is used. The EC is defined as the ratio of food expenditures to total expenditure observed in 
the reference population in the base year (1985-86). Thus: 
Engel coefficient = Food expenditures / Total expenditure. 
In each period, both the numerator and the denominator of the Engel coefficient are 
updated  with  the  price  variations  obtained  from  the  CPI.  According  to  the  relative  price 
variation, the EC is determined each month for the purpose of measuring poverty. In order to 
compound the CBA value, in practice its value is multiplied by the reciprocal of the Engel 
coefficient:  CBT = CBA x 1/Engel coefficient. 
In October, 2000, the reciprocal of the Engel coefficient was 2.42 and the CBA was 
62.44 pesos. Thus we have $ 62.44 (CBA) x 2.42 (reciprocal of EC) = $ 151.10 (CBT) for an 
equivalent  adult).  As  a  last  step,  each  household’s  CBT  value  is  compared  to  the 
household’s  total  income.  If  the  household’s  income  is  less  than  the  CBT  value,  the 
household and its members are considered under the poverty line; otherwise, they will be 
considered as non-poor. 
For October 2001 the INDEC estimates that the CBA is $61, and the CBT $150.1. 
For October 2002 the CBA is $104.9, and the CBT $231.8 (The large increase in both CBA 
and  CBT  during  October  2002  reflects  the  significant  increase  in  prices  experienced  in 
Argentina during that year). 
Table of equivalences
Energetic needs and consumer units by age and sex 
Sex and age 
Energetic 
needs (Kcal) 
Consumer unit / 
Equivalent adult 
Boys and girls
Under 1 year old  880  0.33 
1 year old  1170  0.43 
2 yrs. Old  1360  50 
3 yrs. Old  1500  0.56 
4 to 6 yrs. Old 1710  0.63 
7 to 9 yrs. Old 1950  0.72 
Men 
10 to 12 yrs. Old 2230  0.83 
13 to 15 yrs. Old 2580  0.96 
16 to 17 yrs. Old 2840  1.05 
Women
10 to 12 yrs. Old 1980  0.73 
13 to 15 yrs. Old 2140  0.79 
16 to 17 yrs. Old 2140  0.79 
Men 
18 to 29 yrs. Old 2860  1.06 
30 to 59 yrs. Old 2700  1 
60 yrs. old and over  2840  1.05 
Women
18 to 29 yrs. Old 2000  0.74 
30 to 59 yrs. Old 2000  0.74 
60 yrs. old and over  1730  0.64 
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Appendix 3.  Basic statistics for Participants and Comparison group, May 2001 
  Participants  Comparison Group 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Age  35.0  11.9  35.0  11.9 
Male  0.42  0.49  0.42  0.49 
Head Household  0.38  0.49  0.37  0.48 
Born different province  0.20  0.40  0.20  0.40 
Foreign born  0.05  0.23  0.05  0.21 
Attending educational institution  0.11  0.31  0.10  0.30 
Primary school graduate  0.29  0.45  0.29  0.45 
High school dropout  0.23  0.42  0.22  0.42 
High school graduate  0.16  0.37  0.17  0.38 
Some college  0.12  0.32  0.11  0.31 
College graduate  0.06  0.24  0.06  0.24 
No. dependents  2.16  2.00  2.22  2.17 
Rooms per member  0.72  0.52  0.72  0.50 
Residence in shantytown  0.04  0.20  0.04  0.21 
Lack of access to basic services  0.06  0.25  0.07  0.26 
Property ownership  0.72  0.45  0.72  0.45 
Northwest  0.15  0.35  0.15  0.35 
Northeast  0.11  0.31  0.11  0.31 
Cuyo  0.16  0.37  0.16  0.37 
Pampeana  0.32  0.47  0.32  0.47 
Patagonica  0.19  0.39  0.19  0.39 
No. observations  655  3,275 
Note: The omitted categories are: Born in the same province, Primary school dropout and greater 
Buenos Aires. 